| DOT Pipeline
Compliance Workshop - August 17-18, 2005 |
Top |
Join us at our
Houston office for an informative, lively, and interactive workshop on
DOT Pipeline Compliance and API RP 1162 for DOT Pipelines. This
workshop has been attended by hundreds of pipeline personnel, with
excellent feedback. Day 1 provides an overview of the DOT pipeline
regulations, and is appropriate for people who are new to pipeline
regulations, or who could use a refresher. Day 2 covers each of the 8
elements required in RP 1162.
Day 1: Introduction to DOT/PHMSA Pipeline Regulations
- Agency jurisdictions - what does DOT/PHMSA regulate anyway?
- Important definitions
- Important letters of clarification from the agency
- Recent EPA/DOI memorandums of understanding
- State and Federal program variations, roles and
responsibilities
- Gas and liquid design, construction, operations,
maintenance, and emergency response requirements
- Spill response planning requirements
- How to monitor rule-making activity and stay current with
your compliance program
Your Instructor for Day 1: As principal of RCP, Mr. Byrd enjoys a solid
reputation for working with the public, corporate management, and
regulatory agencies to resolve complex regulatory issues. He serves on
various industry association committees, works as an expert witness and
consulting expert, and is frequently called upon to comment on current
or proposed rule-makings at public and private meetings and
conferences.
Day 2: API RP1162 Overview
The final rule incorporating by reference API Recommended Practice 1162
will go into effect June 20, 2006 for both gas (192) and liquid (195)
pipeline operators. The Public Awareness/API RP1162 Overview will cover
each of the 8 elements required in RP1162. The session will also
include additional information about the more complex elements of
stakeholder audience identification, communication methods and
evaluation of effectiveness. The session will be taught by a leader in
the development of RP1162 who understands the background and intent of
the rule as well as the language.
Your Instructor for Day 2: Susan D. Waller has over twenty-five years
of pipeline experience and has been responsible for developing and
implementing effective pipeline awareness communication programs
throughout North America. Ms. Waller helped lead the development of
API’s Recommended Practice 1162, Public Awareness Programs for Pipeline
Operators.
Increase your understanding of this new rule by attending Day 2 of the
Workshop.
For additional information, including a seminar brochure, go to our
website here.
|
Need to update your Public Awareness Program?
RCP can help develop your updated plan to meet API RP 1162 standards,
and provide turnkey implementation,
mail-outs, evaluations, and tracking of your program.
For more information call or Click Here. |
|
Pipeline
Emergencies
Training Program
|
Top |
The National
Association of State Fire Marshals (NASFM), in conjunction with the
U.S. Department of Transportation, has developed a new training program
to help local emergency response agencies adequately respond to
pipeline emergencies, and is currently holding regional
Train-The-Trainer sessions to ensure local communities receive the
crucial training. The Pipeline Emergencies training program equips
experienced instructors to teach the pipeline safety curriculum to
emergency responders in their regions. The course helps emergency
responders understand pipeline operations, common products transmitted
and distributed through them and tactical response guidelines to deal
with accidents.
The training is being conducted through normal fireman training
facilities, and is coordinated through the local fire marshal
organizations. Since the pipeline industry is required to conduct
liaison activities with local emergency response personnel, they will
benefit by having their local emergency responders more knowledgeable
about general types of pipeline emergencies. The
train-the-trainer schedule for 2005 is available online at the event
website.
At the present time, this training is not being offered to
industry. However, copies of the training materials can be
ordered for a nominal cost here.
|
Integrity
Management Services
RCP can
assist pipeline operators with ongoing compliance management and
engineering associated with your IMP. This includes direct assessment
strategies, tool and vendor selection, ILI/ECDA report analysis,
corrosion control programs, repair strategies, and IMP/risk model
updates. For more information on how RCP can support your ongoing IMP
needs,
Click Here. |
|
| Proposed Rule to
Update Regulatory References to Technical Standards |
Top |
The Office of Pipeline Safety proposes to update the
pipeline safety regulations to incorporate by reference all or parts of
new editions of voluntary consensus technical standards to enable
pipeline operators to utilize current technology, materials, and
practices. 49 CFR parts 192, 193, and 195 incorporate by reference all
or parts of 60 standards and specifications developed and published by
technical organizations. PHMSA proposes to adopt all or part of
recent editions of 39 of the 60 standards referenced in the pipeline
safety regulations. This update enables pipeline operators to
utilize current technology, materials, and practices. The incorporation
of the most recent editions of standards improves clarity, consistency
and accuracy, and reduces unnecessary burdens on the regulated
community.
Comments on the subject of this proposed rule must be received on or
before September 16, 2005 [Docket No. PHMSA-05-21253].
For a complete copy of the notice from the
Federal Register, please
email Jessica
Roger at RCP.
|
"Person Who
Offers"
a Hazardous Material for Transportation
|
Top |
PHMSA is amending
the Hazardous Materials Regulations to add a definition for "person who
offers or offeror." The definition adopted in this final rule codifies
long-standing interpretations and administrative determinations on the
applicability of those regulations. This final rule makes the following
revisions to the HMR:
Defining "person who offers or offeror" to mean any person who performs
or is responsible for performing any pre-transportation function
required by the HMR or who tenders or makes the hazardous material
available to a carrier for transportation in commerce. A carrier is not
an offeror when it performs a function as a condition of accepting a
hazardous material for transportation in commerce or when it transfers
a hazardous material to another carrier for continued transportation
without performing a pre-transportation function.
Clarifying that there may be more than one offeror of a hazardous
material and that each offeror is responsible only for the specific
pre-transportation functions that it performs or is required to
perform.
Clarifying that each offeror or carrier may rely on information
provided by a previous offeror or carrier unless the offeror or carrier
knows or, a reasonable person acting in the circumstances and
exercising reasonable care, would have knowledge that the information
provided is incorrect.
This final rule is effective October 1, 2005.
|
RCP
Services Spotlight - Underwater Inspection Procedures and Interval
Risk Modeling
Underwater
Inspection Procedures – On August 10, 2004, the DOT published final
amendments to 49 CFR 195.413 and 49 CFR 192.612 for Periodic Underwater
Inspections of regulated pipeline facilities located in water depths of
15’ or less in the Gulf of Mexico and its inlets. Effective August 10,
2005, operators of certain hazardous liquid and gas pipelines will be
required to have procedures in place to identify, inspect, and address
those pipelines that are exposed or pose a hazard to navigation. RCP
has experience developing comprehensive pipeline safety procedures
including procedures to meet the new underwater inspection
requirements. RCP can develop comprehensive and customized procedures
that address these requirements, including:
- General application criteria
- Underwater inspection technologies most appropriate
for your pipelines
- Measures to be taken in the event pipelines are
exposed or pose a threat to navigation
- Risk-based analysis to determine appropriate
inspection intervals
Inspection Interval Risk Modeling - The recently
finalized regulations for Periodic Underwater Inspections are
performance-based and require certain pipeline operators to develop
procedures to identify and take appropriate action for lines that pose
a hazard to navigation or are otherwise exposed. The Office of Pipeline
Safety suggests the use of risk analysis when developing the rationale
for inspection intervals. RCP’s development of a proven integrity
management risk model has enabled us to translate that success into
development of a similar approach to identify underwater inspection
intervals.
If you would like information regarding RCP’s Underwater Inspection
Procedures or Interval Risk Modeling e-mail Jessica Roger or call (713) 655-8080.
|
|
O&M
Manual Up-To-Date?
RCP has the
tools and expertise to develop comprehensive procedures that you need
to protect your people, facilities, and environment.
Click Here
|
|
Public Meeting
on Applying, Interpreting, and Evaluating Data from ILI Devices
|
Top |
|
Editor’s
note: I apologize for the length of the following article, but I think
you will find the information very helpful in understanding OPS’s
concerns on this topic.
The Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) is hosting a public meeting to
discuss concerns it has with how operators are applying, interpreting,
and evaluating data acquired from In-Line Inspection Devices (ILI), and
OPS's expectations about how operators should be effectively
integrating this data with other information about the operator's
pipeline. The meeting will be held Thursday, August 11, 2005, from 8:30
a.m. to 4.30 p.m. in Houston,
TX, and is open to
all interested parties. The meeting location has not been determined
yet and will be made available on http://ops.dot.gov shortly.
ILI technology has been used for
approximately 20 years and has become the preferred method used by
pipeline operators to ensure the integrity of their pipeline assets.
However, as demonstrated by recent accidents on hazardous liquid and
natural gas pipeline systems, some pipelines that were inspected by ILI
devices continue to fail. OPS will share its
findings from these accidents and from recent Integrity Management
Program (IMP) inspections. OPS needs to determine if the problem
resides in the technology or in the secondary and tertiary stages of
the ILI data evaluation-data
characterization, validation, and mitigation. Specifically, is the
problem data analysis, peer review of technicians involved in data
review, lack of common standards for data review, detection thresholds,
data validation, or the understanding of each tool's strengths and
weaknesses? A secondary objective of this meeting is for OPS to
understand how the government, pipeline operators, standards
organizations, and ILI vendors can help improve pipeline assessment
using ILI technology. At this public
meeting, OPS will highlight effective practices and use this medium to
share these practices with the public.
The preliminary agenda for this meeting includes briefings on the
following topics:
- OPS's
Experiences on Data Extracted using ILI Devices
- OPS
Case Studies
- Hazardous
Liquid IMP Inspection Experiences
- Views
of Pipeline Operators
- Perspective
from ILI Vendors
- Focus
of Independent ILI Data Analysts
- ILI
Standards
- Personnel
Qualification and Vendor Reports
- ILI
Flaw Detection Criteria
- ILI
Data Discrimination
- Field
Evaluation of ILI Data-Statistical
Sampling, Flaw Thresholds, and Tolerances
- Contractual
Criteria for Defect Reports
- Next
Steps
OPS is concerned about the secondary and tertiary evaluations being
performed after ILI data is acquired because of several accidents that
have occurred throughout the U.S. in the recent past. According to
OPS's experience, failures have occurred on pipelines inspected by all
types of ILI tools. The following are
some examples of pipelines that failed relatively soon after the
pipelines were inspected, the data was analyzed, and the findings were
reported to the pipeline operators:
- In
1999, a small hazardous liquid pipeline operator used a
state-of-the-art tool and mis-characterized a "wrinkle with a crack" as
a "T-piece." A few months later the pipeline ruptured at the location
of this wrinkle. Most appurtenances and fittings like a T-Piece will be
welded to the main pipe. However, there were no girth welds on either
side of this mis-characterized T-piece as is typical for a T-piece.
- In
2003, a hazardous liquid pipeline that was inspected just about a year
before, failed in service. OPS's investigation revealed that general
corrosion caused the failure. On analyzing the data, OPS gathered that
the ILI tool detected some pitting
and the maximum pit depth was reported to be less that 50% of remaining
wall. However, from a metallurgical analysis of the pipe segment OPS
discovered 27 corrosion pits varying from 18% wall loss to 95% wall
loss. The pipe failed where the wall loss was 95%.
- In
February 2004, a natural gas pipeline operator launched a geometry pig
but the tool missed a series of wrinkles. One of those wrinkles
ruptured. During our post-incident investigation OPS discovered that
other wrinkles in the pipe were called out as pipe wall thickness
changes although there were no girth welds adjacent to the location
where the wall thickness changed.
- Another
hazardous liquid pipeline that was inspected seven times with different
tools in a span of 10 years ruptured in 2004. The rupture was
determined to have been caused by general corrosion. The general
corrosion was detected by an ILI tool launched before the most recent
ILI run.
- In
October 2004, a hazardous liquid pipeline operator launched three
tools-a geometry pig, a corrosion detection pig, and an axial flaw
detection pig-in relative succession to conduct a baseline assessment
and to comply with the IMP regulations. About six months after these
tools were launched, the pipeline's seam split.
- In
November 2003, incipient third party damage caused another hazardous
liquid pipeline to rupture just eight months after it was pigged. An
investigation revealed several longitudinal scratches and gouges on the
pipe surface that were undetected by the ILI
device.
OPS has also learned that pipeline operators do not have a consistent,
standardized process to evaluate and assess data extracted by ILI
devices. For example, some pipeline
operators provide guidance to ILI vendors, contract field inspection
personnel, and company personnel on how to assess ILI
data. Others rely entirely on the ILI vendor or may actively
participate in data extraction, or may even conduct an independent peer
review of the ILI data if they have
in-house expertise. For corrosion anomalies, pipeline operators use
different interaction criteria. Some pipeline operators want only the
deepest pit reported on each pipe length. Others want all pit depths
reported. One pipeline operator directed the ILI
vendor to report all anomalies, especially those with signatures that
are indecipherable. OPS believes this to be a good practice, although
it is not universally applied.
OPS believes that most of the pipeline failures that occurred on
pipeline segments that were inspected with ILI tools could have been
prevented with the correct application of technology. The failures that
OPS investigated have revealed that the larger problem may be with the
machine-man interface during the latter stages of data analysis.
Specifically, should the repositories of flaw signatures that ILI
vendors use be improved? Must there be more
attention expended on the peer review of technicians? Is the sample
size used to confirm electronic data adequate or must it be increased?
Should the data extraction process be more stringently monitored?
During this public meeting, OPS will seek answers to the following
questions:
- What
are operators' experiences and expectations with the capabilities of
ILI
technology?
- Is
there a gap in understanding ILI tool
data submitted by vendors of this technology?
- Do
ILI technology vendors
educate their clients about the limitations of the tool being
recommended for the application?
- What
defect detection and report criteria are used? Is it developed jointly
by the vendor and the pipeline operator?
- How
are tool defect identification tolerances applied in reported criteria?
- Is
there a formal detection, validation, and mitigation process used to
evaluate defects? How is it communicated to the pipeline operator?
- What
process is used to arrive at the number of confirmatory digs to
corroborate the data extracted by the ILI
device?
- Are
the standards developed for ILI technology appropriate for the current
state ILI deployment? Does the
guidance meet the needs of the large or small pipeline operator who is
the first-time user of such technology?
OPS expects at this public meeting to inform on the following:
- The
technique and criteria used to report defects
- Information
exchange between the ILI vendor and
pipeline operator during the secondary and tertiary stages of flaw
characterization
- The
currency and adequacy of performance standards for vendors of
assessment technologies
- Sufficiency
and relevance of performance standards for ILI
assessment technology
- Stages
in data discrimination: Detection, validation, and mitigation
|
Need to Update Your Current Operator Qualification Program?
We have the expertise to update your current operator qualification
program to satisfy the upcoming regulation change and inspection
protocols.
Click Here to request more information.
|
|
Beginning Steps
on
Pipeline Security Legislation
|
Top |
The joint majority
and minority staff of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation hosted a meeting this week to discuss sections 406-408
of S.1052, which would establish a federal pipeline security
program. The bill outlines a plan for the Federal Government to
provide increased security support to the most critical interstate and
intrastate natural gas and hazardous liquid transmission pipeline
infrastructure and operations. It also discuses the need for an
incident recovery protocol plan to ensure the continued transportation
of natural gas and hazardous liquids to essential markets in the event
of an incident affecting the interstate and intrastate natural gas and
hazardous liquid transmission and distribution pipeline systems.
Under S.1052.407, a complete review of the pipeline security plans and
inspection of the critical facilities of the 100 most critical pipeline
operators will occur in order to target inspection and enforcement
actions to the most vulnerable and critical pipeline assets and
correctly assess regulatory demands.
The bill has the Transportation Security Administration of the
Department of Homeland Security in the lead with support from both
public and private entities in the form of interstate and intrastate
transmission and distribution pipeline operators labor, first
responders, shippers of hazardous materials, State Departments of
Transportation, public safety officials and other relevant parties.
But, this bill requires a memorandum of agreement with the Department
of Transportation to divide up the roles and responsibilities in
ensuring pipeline security between these two agencies. The recent
terrorist attack on the mass transit system in London probably
increases the odds of passage of a comprehensive security package for
critical transportation assets and other at-risk facilities such as
chemical plants. You can get a copy of the bill at http://thomas.loc.gov.
|
Integrity
Management Plan Up-to-Date?
RCP has the
tools and expertise to develop comprehensive Integrity Management Plans
for both liquid and gas pipelines. Click Here if you would like information on RCP's
Integrity Management Services and receive a copy of our FREE Integrity Management CD.
|
|
Integrity
Management
Notification for Gas Transmission Lines
|
Top |
Current
regulations (49 CFR 192, Subpart O) require operators of gas
transmission lines to notify OPS and state pipeline safety agencies of
certain events related to integrity management programs for gas
transmission lines. Operators are required to notify OPS of each of the
following events: a) when the operator makes substantial changes to the
operator’s integrity management program, b) when the operator
plans the use of technology other than in-line inspection, pressure
testing, or direct assessment to perform assessments of pipeline
integrity, and c). when the operator cannot meet the schedule required
for remediating an identified condition and cannot provide safety
through a temporary reduction in operating pressure or other
action. The Office of Pipeline Safety has issued an Advisory
Bulletin (ADB-05-04) to provide guidance on notifying OPS and state
agencies and describes OPS’ review of notifications. OPS expects this
bulletin to improve the efficiency of the notification and review
process.
For Further Information Contact: Zach Barrett by phone at (405)
954–5559
or by e-mail.
|
Are
Your Response Plans Current?
RCP can
provide audits and updates to help ensure that your spill and emergency
response plans are current and meet federal and state requirements.
Click Here. |
|
| Congress Clears Energy Bill |
Top |
The US Senate
approved a national energy plan 74-26 on July 29th. With this vote, the
Conference Committee on the energy bill (H.R. 6) issued a report
confirming that the reform is now ready for the President's signature,
as the bill cleared the House of Representatives earlier. The President
is expected to sign the bill, thus creating "The Energy Policy Act of
2005." The bill provides a mix of tax breaks, fuels, employment
opportunities, cleaner burning coal, and the next generation of nuclear
reactors. Some highlights include:
- FERC “shall have exclusive
authority to approve or deny an application for the siting,
construction, expansion, or operation of an LNG terminal.” States
maintain their existing authorities under otherwise applicable
environmental laws.
- FERC is the lead agency in
reviewing permits for projects required under Section 3 or Section 7 of
the Natural Gas Act. The Energy Bill also mandates that FERC has
authority to set the schedule for “all Federal authorizations.”
The FERC record is also established as the official record for any
appeals under the Coastal Zone Management Act, or in court reviews of
Federal and state administrative actions related to the proposed
project. The Energy Bill also establishes the judicial review
process for permitting decisions. It also requires FERC to
establish regulations for the pre-filing/public consultation process.
- The Secretary of Interior is
to conduct an inventory and analysis of oil and gas resources found in
the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf within six months of enactment.
The Secretary of Interior must also submit the results of the inventory
in a report to Congress, which will include a description of “how
legislative, regulatory, and administrative programs or processes
restrict or impede the development of identified resources and the
extent to which they affect domestic supply, such as moratoria, lease
terms and conditions, operational stipulations and requirements,
approval delays by the Federal Government and coastal States, and local
zoning restrictions for onshore processing facilities and pipeline
landings.”
- The Secretary of Commerce
will have deadlines for the review of appeals on decisions regarding
whether federal activities that affect the coastal zone are consistent
with State management programs.
- “Federal Permit Streamlining
Pilot Project” - The Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture, the EPA
Administrator and Chief of the Army Corps of Engineers are required to
enter into an MOU to establish a pilot project within 90 days of
enactment. The pilot project will be conducted in Wyoming,
Montana, New Mexico, Colorado and Utah. Within three years, the
Secretary of Interior must report on the “results of the Pilot Project
to date” and “whether the Pilot Project should be implemented
throughout the U.S.”
- Energy R-O-W Corridors on
Federal Land are addressed by agencies in consultation with FERC, the
States, tribes and utilities with designated “corridors for oil, gas,
and hydrogen pipelines and electricity transmission and distribution
facilities on Federal land in eleven western States. The
designation requires, within two years, an advance environmental review
likely to make the siting of facilities within designated corridors
much less challenging. Agencies have four years to designate
similar corridors on federal lands in the other 39 states.
Agencies are required to expedite applications to construct or modify
pipelines within [these] corridors.”
- The Bill calls for Progress
Reports on Alaska Natural Gas Pipeline within six months of enactment,
and every six months thereafter until the Alaska Natural Gas Pipeline
begins operating, FERC must report to Congress on “the progress made in
licensing and constructing the pipeline, and any issues impeding that
progress.”
For more information regarding the
"Energy Policy Act of 2005"
including text and highlights, visit the Committee on Energy and
Commerce on their website.
|
Temporary Water Right
Authorizations Required from Texas Commission on Environmental Quality
|
Top |
The Texas Commission on
Environmental Quality (TCEQ) requested that the Texas Railroad
Commission post an advisory notice concerning use of surface water in
association with oil and gas activities.
Water flowing in Texas creeks, rivers, and bays is state water or
“waters of the state.” Under Section 11 of the Texas Water Code anyone
who diverts water must have authorization – or water right -- from the
State of Texas through the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality
(TCEQ). Persons who withdraw "waters of the state" for mining,
construction, and oil and gas activities must obtain a water rights
permit from TCEQ. An applicant may apply for a Temporary Water Right
permit for short-term use of “waters of the State.” Temporary Water
Rights permits authorizing use of 10 acre feet or less and for one year
or less may be issued by your closest TCEQ. Applicants who seek to use
more than 10 acre-feet of water or who seek a term of more than one
year (up to a maximum of three years) will need to apply through the
TCEQ Water Rights Permitting Team in Austin.
TCEQ forms, fees, contacts and other information may be found online here.
|
| Pipeline
Professionals Referrals |
Top |
From time to time,
we are asked by pipeline operators if we know of any qualified pipeline
professionals that are active in the job market. In addition, RCP
is always interested in highly qualified individuals in the job market
that have expertise in regulatory compliance management. If you
are aware of any pipeline professionals that are active on the job
market, please let them know to contact us. They can send their
inquiries discreetly to hr@your-rcp.com.
At the present time, we
are aware of several opportunities, including:
- Pipeline Integrity
Management - Assessment Coordinator, Data Analysis, Program
Implementation Management
- Pipeline Facility Permitting
Engineer
- Environmental Coordinator
- FERC Inspector
- Construction Safety
Coordinator
|
If you
have a regulatory-issue meeting planned, let
us know, and we'll announce it in both our Vessel and
Facility Newsletter and our DOT Pipeline Newsletter.
Yours,
W. R. (Bill) Byrd, PE
President
RCP Inc.
888-727-9937
wrbyrd@your-rcp.com
www.your-rcp.com
RCP - Your Regulatory Compliance Partner!
Visit Regulatory Compliance Partners on the Web at
http://www.your-rcp.com
or call us at 1-888-RCP-X-YES to see what we can do for you.
|